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Recalling First Principles: The 
Importance of Comity in Avoiding 
Antitrust Imperialism 
J. Frank Hogue∗ 
In his bestselling book The World Is Flat, Pulitzer 
Prize-winning journalist Thomas Friedman provides everyday 
examples of how globalization has re-shaped the commercial 
world over the course of the last two decades.1 While Friedman’s 
thesis is much larger than just the effect of globalization on 
commerce and the changes we have witnessed in the yet-young 
twenty-first century world, he devotes significant space to how 
foreign countries have helped shape the newly-flat world.2 In 
particular, he examines how their companies have dramatically 
reorganized global supply chains and have become indispensable 
players in the modern commercial landscape.3 Friedman recounts 
his experience in 2004 of ordering a notebook computer and the 
variety of countries and companies that he is linked to in this 
transaction.4 He traces the supply chain that created his 
                                                                                                     
 ∗ J. Frank Hogue is a senior associate in White & Case’s Global 
Competition Group. He is a litigator whose work focuses on defending major 
international corporations against allegations that they violated U.S. antitrust 
and competition laws. He has represented companies in various U.S. federal 
courts, before the DOJ, FTC, SEC, and state antitrust enforcement agencies as 
well as in matters involving competition authorities in various foreign 
jurisdictions. This article is written in his personal capacity and the views 
expressed herein are his own.  
 1. See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT 3.0: A BRIEF 
HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2007). 
 2. See id. at 127–66 (describing foreign countries’ contributions to the 
world’s “flattening” process). 
 3. See id. at 151–66 (discussing how foreign companies have influenced 
supply chains).  
 4. See id. at 580–85 (“Before I share with you the subject of this chapter, I 
have to tell you a little bit about the computer that I wrote this book 
on . . . . This book was largely written on a Dell Inspirion 600m notebook, 
service tag number 9ZRJP41.”). 
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computer and identifies the various companies and countries that 
supplied components of his new computer.5 
Friedman writes that “the total supply chain for my 
computer, including suppliers of suppliers, involved about four 
hundred companies in North America, Europe and primarily 
Asia, but with thirty key players.”6 The part-by-part breakdown 
dramatically shows the extent to which foreign countries 
increasingly supply the building blocks of electronics sold far 
from their own shores.7 
Friedman highlights the complexity of Dell’s supply chain 
and the diversity of component suppliers to make a geopolitical 
point.8 An outbreak of armed conflict in East or Southeast Asia 
would “seriously unflatten” global commerce.9 Friedman 
observes:  
[A]s the world flattens, one of the most interesting dramas to 
watch in international relations will be the interplay between 
the traditional global threats and the newly emergent global 
supply chains. The interaction between old-time threats (like 
China versus Taiwan) and just-in-time supply chains (like 
China plus Taiwan) will be a rich source of study for the field 
of international relations in the early twenty-first century.10 
                                                                                                     
 5. See id. at 580–85 (listing component manufacturers for each step in the 
supply chain). 
 6. Id. at 585. 
 7. See id. at 582–83 (identifying the Philippines, Costa Rica, Malaysia, 
China, Korea, Taiwan, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Singapore, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Ireland, India, and Israel as the locations of key suppliers who 
possibly supplied components for his notebook computer). 
 8. See id. at 585 (using the notebook computer story “to tell a larger story 
of geopolitics in the flat world” and indicating that “an outbreak of a good, 
old-fashioned, world-shaking, economy-destroying war” threatens to hold back 
or even reverse the flattening process). 
 9. See id. 
It could be China deciding once and for all to eliminate Taiwan as an 
independent state; or North Korea, out of fear or insanity, using one 
of its nuclear weapons against South Korea or Japan; or Israel and 
soon-to-be-nuclear Iran going at each other; or India and Pakistan 
finally nuking it out. These and other classic geopolitical conflicts 
could erupt at any time and either slow the flattening of the world or 
seriously unflatten it. 
 10. Id. at 586. 
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I would add a somewhat less apocalyptic source of conflict 
that may hamper the operation of global commerce: the 
overzealous extraterritorial application of antitrust laws. Each of 
the countries that supplied a part of Mr. Friedman’s computer 
have their own laws and regulations that govern the conduct of 
companies doing business within their borders, among them 
competition laws that delineate what is and what is not 
permissible.11 These regulations reflect the legal and commercial 
traditions unique to particular jurisdictions, and embody the 
differing choices made by these states. And, of course, the United 
States has its own innumerable laws that govern the conduct of 
commerce within its own borders.12 These are the product of the 
U.S. and Western commercial heritage. As to all of the countries, 
it has long been established in international law that principles 
of sovereignty permit these nations to apply their laws to conduct 
occurring within their territory.13 But conflict and friction in the 
international commercial system can occur when one nation 
seeks to apply its own laws to conduct that takes place within the 
borders of another nation.14 The extraterritorial application of 
                                                                                                     
 11. See Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the 56th Annual Spring Meeting of the ABA 
Section of Antitrust Law: Recent Developments, Trends, and Milestones in the 
Antitrust Division’s Criminal Enforcement Program 18 (Mar. 26, 2008), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/232716.pdf (“Seemingly with each 
passing day, the antitrust community learns of a foreign government that has 
enacted a new antitrust law, created a new cartel investigative unit, obtained a 
record antitrust fine, or adopted a new corporate leniency program.”); Andreas 
Mundt, Chair, Int’l Competition Network, Focus, Inclusiveness and 
Implementation—The ICN as a Key Factor for Global Convergence in 
Competition Law 2 (Sept. 5, 2013), http://internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/ 
uploads/library/doc924.pdf (explaining that the International Competition 
Network is comprised of 126 agency members from 111 different jurisdictions). 
 12. See, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (making illegal every 
contract, combination, or conspiracy “in restraint of trade or commerce among 
the several States, or with foreign nations”); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (2012) 
(prohibiting anticompetitive conduct). 
 13. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 297 
(6th ed. 2003) (“The starting-point in this part of the law is the proposition that, 
at least as a presumption, jurisdiction is territorial.”). 
 14. See Brief for Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees 3, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics 
Corp., 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-8003) (“‘[E]xcessive’ extraterritorial 
application of competition law tends to bring about serious tension between the 
countries involved.”); Brief for Belgian Competition Authority as Amicus Curiae 
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antitrust regulations is a potent example. Conflict is particularly 
possible when it is American antitrust law that is urged to reach 
foreign commerce and conduct.15 While such an application can 
be permissible in certain circumstances, there are constraints on 
the extraterritorial application of American antitrust laws to 
alleviate such friction.16 One such constraint, but certainly not 
the only one, is the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act 
(FTAIA).17 
While the FTAIA initially enjoyed little celebrity, it has 
taken on an increased importance in debates over how far and to 
what conduct American courts should extend the reach of 
American antitrust law.18 Increasingly, American courts have 
taken up the proper application of FTAIA to cases involving 
                                                                                                     
Supporting Appellee 6, Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d 816 (No. 14-8003) (“The 
proliferation of competition law systems can contribute significantly to a better 
functioning of markets. But without the necessary convergence and comity, 
conflicting policies may well become a significant obstacle to trade and 
investment, as recognized by nations across the globe.”). 
 15. See F. Hoffmann–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 
(2004) (“No one denies that America’s antitrust laws, when applied to foreign 
conduct, can interfere with a foreign nation’s ability independently to regulate 
its own commercial affairs.”); Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 824 (stating that 
increasing “the global reach of the Sherman Act” would “creat[e] friction with 
many foreign countries”). 
 16. See Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 824 (emphasizing that the United 
States is not “the world’s competition police officer”). 
 17. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012) 
Sections 1 to 7 of this title [the Sherman Act] shall not apply to 
conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or 
import commerce) with foreign nations unless— 
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable effect— 
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with 
foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with 
foreign nations; or  
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of 
a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United 
States; and  
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the [Sherman Act]. 
 18. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 678 (9th Cir. 
2004) (“Federal courts did not shower the FTAIA with attention for the first 
decade after its enactment.”), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. 
Hui Hsiung, 758 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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foreign conduct, foreign commerce, and domestic claims.19 So too 
has academia, producing a remarkable volume of scholarly 
research and shining much-needed light on a once-obscure 
statute.20  
It is into this already-crowded field that Ms. Leonard bravely 
enters with her timely Note, In Need of Direction: An Evaluation 
of the “Direct Effect” Requirement Under the Foreign Trade 
Antitrust Improvements Act.21 In her Note, Ms. Leonard seeks to 
identify the appropriate test to allow the FTAIA to play its proper 
role in the modern global economy.22 Ms. Leonard focuses her 
analysis on a single aspect of the analysis with which courts 
engage when applying the FTAIA, namely the direct effect 
prong.23 She skillfully dissects and analyzes two differing tests 
that courts have used in evaluating whether there is a sufficient 
link between foreign conduct and an alleged harm to domestic 
                                                                                                     
 19. See, e.g., Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 818–20 (considering the 
FTAIA’s application to foreign conduct); Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. 
Co., 753 F.3d 395, 409–15 (2d Cir. 2014) (deciding whether defendant’s foreign 
anticompetitive conduct gave rise to plaintiff’s antitrust claim); Minn-Chem, 
Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 856–60 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (analyzing 
whether the FTAIA applied to a foreign potash cartel); Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. 
v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 470–72 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing the 
FTAIA’s text as it applies to the foreign defendant’s foreign conduct); United 
Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 952–53 (7th Cir. 2003) (en 
banc) (discussing whether the FTAIA applied to foreign behavior), overruled on 
other grounds by Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d 845 (overruling United Phosphorus’s 
holding that the FTAIA’s requirements are jurisdictional in nature). 
 20. See generally Max Huffman, A Retrospective on Twenty-Five Years of 
the Foreign Antitrust Improvements Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 285 (2007); Robert D. 
Sowell, New Decisions Highlight Old Misgivings: A Reassessment of the Foreign 
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act Following Minn-Chem, 66 FLA. L. REV. 511 
(2014); Joseph P. Bauer, The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Do We 
Really Want to Return to American Banana?, 65 ME. L. REV. 3 (2012); Ryan A. 
Haas, Act Locally, Apply Globally: Protecting Consumers from International 
Cartels by Applying Domestic Antitrust Law Globally, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 
99 (2003). 
 21. Claire L. Leonard, In Need of Direction: An Evaluation of the “Direct 
Effect” Requirement Under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 73 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489 (2016).  
 22. See id. at 493–96 (considering the question of when American antitrust 
law applies to purely foreign anticompetitive conduct). 
 23. See id. at 492 (“In a globalized economy, the precise meaning of direct 
becomes even more elusive—and more significant—in the face of complex 
corporate structures and elaborate supply chains that span numerous 
countries.”). 
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American commerce.24 And while Ms. Leonard’s analysis is sound 
and her ultimate conclusion well-supported, fundamental 
principles of comity—a first principle when discussing foreign 
application of a nation’s law—plays only a supporting role in her 
Note.25 
But notions of international comity must not be relegated to 
such a secondary position. Courts, including the U.S. Supreme 
Court, have recognized that comity concerns play a prime role as 
a first principle in determining whether to extend the antitrust 
laws to foreign conduct.26 Because, as the Court observed, “Why 
should American law supplant, for example, Canada’s or Great 
Britain’s or Japan’s own determination about how best to protect 
Canadian or British or Japanese customers from anticompetitive 
conduct engaged in significant part by Canadian or British or 
Japanese or other foreign companies?”27  
As other countries have urged, “Greater comity is required in 
our modern era when international transactions involve a 
constant flow of products, wealth and people across the globe.”28 
Greater comity leaves other countries free to organize their 
economies and develop their own domestic industries in 
                                                                                                     
 24. See id. at 507–15 (analyzing the two diverging tests for a “direct effect” 
in the FTAIA: (1) the immediate consequence test and (2) the reasonably 
proximate causal nexus test). 
 25. See id. at 527–31 (devoting only a short section to discussing comity 
concerns). 
 26. See F. Hoffmann–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 163–
65 (2004)  
[T]his Court ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to avoid 
unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other 
nations . . . . This rule of construction reflects principles of customary 
international law—law that (we must assume) Congress ordinarily 
seeks to follow. . . . This rule of statutory construction cautions courts 
to assume that legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign 
interests of other nations when they write American laws. It thereby 
helps the potentially conflicting laws of different nations work 
together in harmony—a harmony particularly needed in today’s 
highly interdependent commercial world.  
(citations omitted).  
 27. Id. at 165. 
 28. Brief for the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Reversal at 7, F. Hoffman–La Roche, 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724), 2004 WL 
226389 (quoting Hunt v. T&N plc, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289, 322 (Can.)). 
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accordance with the wishes of their own people.29 As the 
government of Japan has put it, Japan “has significant economic, 
political, and legal interests in ensuring that companies based in 
Japan shall comply with the Japanese legal system, and that 
Japanese companies running businesses elsewhere shall comply 
with ‘reasonable’ jurisdictional requirements of other nations.”30 
The United Kingdom, Ireland, and the Netherlands cited the U.S. 
Supreme Court to renowned scholar Vaughan Lowe in making 
the point that a faithful adherence to notions of international 
comity preserve to each country the ability to conduct its 
domestic affairs in accordance with that nation’s own norms and 
priorities.31 An overzealous extraterritorial application of U.S. 
antitrust laws, and failure to heed comity concerns, risks 
“fail[ing] to give proper consideration to the legitimate choices 
those nations have made concerning the regulation of their own 
commerce and competition in their own industries.”32 
Returning to Mr. Friedman’s computer, each of the fifteen 
countries at issue in the supply chain has elected to regulate its 
company’s activities in accordance with the social and political 
considerations unique to its respective nation.33 A review of the 
list of countries reveals a number of societies that are climbing 
the ladder from second-world status to become important 
                                                                                                     
 29. See id. at 165 (acknowledging that applying American law “creates a 
serious risk of interference with a foreign nation’s ability independently to 
regulate its own commercial affairs”). 
 30. Brief for the Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 1, F. Hoffman–La Roche, 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724), 2004 WL 
226390, at *1.  
 31. See Brief for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners at 18, F. Hoffman–La Roche, 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724), 
2004 WL 226597, at *18 (citing Lowe’s observation that “[t]he legal rules and 
principles governing jurisdiction have a fundamental importance in 
international relations, because they are concerned with the allocation between 
States . . . of competence to regulate daily life—that is, the competence to secure 
the differences that make each State a distinct society” (quoting Vaughan Lowe, 
Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 329, 330 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2003))). 
 32. Brief for the Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7, F. Hoffmann–La Roche Ltd. v. 
Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724), 2003 WL 22896686, at *7. 
 33. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (listing countries in the supply 
chain). 
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exporters and links in the global supply chain.34 Courts in the 
United States should recognize and take heed of the different 
commercial decisions these foreign countries and their citizens 
have made and keep in mind comity considerations when 
interpreting the FTAIA when judging claimed violations of the 
antitrust laws. 
Ms. Leonard demonstrates admirable courage and skill in 
delving into the technical nuances of the notoriously difficult 
FTAIA. I believe that the body of academic literature is richer 
with the contributions of her Note. I hope that she continues 
what she has begun and turns her future efforts to those 
fundamental principles that provide the foundation for the 
extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws. 
                                                                                                     
 34. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (listing countries in the supply 
chain). 
